Working Papers
- “Dark Money and Voter Learning” (with Keith E. Schnakenberg and Ian R. Turner). R&R.
- Abstract: We provide a model of dark money in elections. An ideologically extreme donor with private information about candidate ideology and quality can advertise on behalf of a candidate. Advertising reveals information about candidate quality to voters, who can learn from either donor-funded or neutral advertising. Voters update negatively about candidate ideology when ads are known to be donor-funded. Dark money suppresses source information and allows donors to advertise candidate quality while simultaneously concealing the ideological motivations behind ad funding. However, dark money leads voters to be suspicious of all advertising, which can end up harming voter welfare.
- “The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms” (with Daniel A. N. Goldstein).
- Abstract: Political executives often adhere to informal traditions established by their predecessors. Yet, without legal backing, elites have incentives to violate norms for political gain. Under what conditions do constraining executive norms persist and when are they abandoned? We address this question by using an infinite horizon formal model to analyze the maintenance of executive norms. We identify intra-party accountability and variation in patience among actors within the same party as significant for norm maintenance. We also detail how expectations about the expected behavior of out-of-power parties shape the willingness to violate norms while in office. The insights from the model enable us to classify a number of executive norms according to their fragility and to examine the trajectory of one norm in-depth: the two-term tradition of the American presidency. Our findings shed light on how informal institutions regulate executive behavior and advance our understanding of institutional stability and erosion.
- “Term Limits and Strategic Challenger Entry.”
- Abstract: It is well understood that electoral institutions, and term limits in particular, affect electoral accountability. In this project, I explore an additional avenue through which term limits can impact accountability. I develop a political agency model with strategic challengers to examine the accountability effects of term limits in the presence of strategic challenger entry. Analysis of the game reveals that term limits may lead strong challengers to delay entering, preferring to run in an open-seat election over running against an incumbent. This behavior of the challenger leads high-type incumbents to exert less effort while in office under certain conditions. In addition to this accountability effect, the model predicts that term limits negatively affect selection. Term limits create conditions for low-type incumbents to be more willing to exert high effort, leading the voter to retain low types more frequently. This pattern is exacerbated by strategic entry. However, strong challengers’ strategic delay behavior disappears when term limits are removed, improving accountability and selection. This project contributes to our understanding of how term limits interact with, and potentially interfere with, electoral accountability and selection when challengers make strategic entry decisions.
- “Legislative Term Limits and Variation in State Intergovernmental Transfers.”
- Abstract: State transfers provide local governments with revenues that are consequential in both magnitude and impact. Similarly, these transfers are a significant expense for state governments. This state aid funds, among other things, education, public health, and welfare programs. Given the importance of these funds for local governments, it is important to understand how institutional choices may affect the distribution of state aid. I use data on state intergovernmental transfers to county areas from 1982–2012 to analyze the relationship between term limits and variation in transfers. Using a difference-in-differences style design, I show that both the adoption and implementation of legislative term limits are associated with greater within-state-year variation in transfers to county areas.
Works in Progress
- “The `Daily Mail Test’: How Public Trust Constrains Bureaucratic Discretion in Public Procurement” (with Daniel A. N. Goldstein and Johannes Wiedemann.
- Abstract: Institutional reforms often reshape political behavior by revising formal rules, but their success depends on informal factors that broker their impact. In high-capacity states, laws granting officials greater discretion can enhance policy outcomes by allowing them to exploit informational advantages. However, in the aftermath of high-profile bureaucratic failures or corruption scandals, declining public trust may inhibit officials’ willingness — or ability — to exercise discretion effectively. We argue that the effectiveness of increased bureaucratic discretion depends on public trust in government institutions. We develop a formal model that captures the interaction between bureaucratic capacity, public trust, and discretion in shaping the quality of government output. Empirically, we test this framework in the context of public procurement, where bureaucrats exercise discretion in soliciting bids and evaluating contracts. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design based on the phased implementation of an EU directive across 33 European countries, we show that the benefits of discretion depend critically on both institutional capacity and public trust, thus clarifying the conditions for effective governance.
- “Term Limits and Special Interest Groups.”
